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Benson and Resnick: Sound Amplifiers Reconsidered
NOTES
the concept becomes readily apparent upon a examination of the large
number of cases based on it in the State of Florida alone. The logical
construction of this phrase and the varied application of the broad underlying principle must be thoroughly understood in order to guarantee the
right. The procedural machinery, since the issue is basic, should be
promptly and accurately set in motion.
At the same time, efficient administration of our criminal law is fostered by paying careful heed to the limitations involved. Although AngloAmerican jurisprudence strongly prefers to allow some of the guilty to go
free rather than to convict an innocent person, the defense of double, or
former, jeopardy is not available as a shield against only one prosecution
per offense. After this one prosecution, but not before then, the protection
of the Constitution may be invoked to prevent oppressive criminal actions.
RoBERT M. JoHNsoz;
WLLAM P. OWEN, JR.

SOUND AMPLIFIERS RECONSIDERED
Within a period of seven months the United States Supreme Court has
rendered two decisions1 affecting the regulation of sound trucks. 2 Despite
the fact that these cases are confusing and possibly contradictory, they
merit the fullest consideration, since they bring into sharp relief the conflict between two divergent concepts, the preservation of freedom of speech
and the protection of the public from nuisances.
People v. Saunders, 4 Park. Cr. Rep. 196 (N. Y. 1859); State v. Lewis, 9 N. C. 98
(1822); Commonwealth v. Robinson, 85 Pa. Super. 424 (1925); Olney v. State, 51
Okla. Cr. 309, 1 P.2d 799 (1931); State 'v. Chaffen, 2 Swan 493, 32 Tenn. 352 (1852);
Mason v. State, 29 Tex. App. 24, 14 S. W. 71 (1890); State v. Smith, 43 Vt. 324
(1870); Bisnop, CpmnNAT LAw §1050 (7th ed. 1882); 4 Br. Comm. *336 (1832);
see State v. McLaughlin, 121 Kan. 693, 249 Pac. 612, 614 (1926); State v. Noel, 66
N. D. 676, 268 N. W. 654, 656 (1936); Crowley v. State, 94 Ohio St. 88, 113 N. E.
658 (1916); State v. Magone, 33 Ore. 570, 56 Pac. 648, 649 (1899); State v. Campbell, 40 Wash. 480, 82 Pac. 752i 753 (1905) ; cf. State v. Gleason, 56 Iowa 203, 9 N. W.

126 (1881).
'Kovacs v. Cooper, 69 Sup. Ct. 448 (1949); Saia v. New York, 334 U. S. 558

(1948).
'The Saia case was discussed and criticized in Note, 2 U. ol FLA. L. REv. 103 (1949).
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In Kovacs v. Cooper 3 an evenly divided state court sustained the defendant's conviction under an ordinance 4 of the city of Trenton prohibiting the use of sound trucks, sound amplifiers, or any other instrument
emitting loud and raucous noises on the public streets. On appeal, the
Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the judgment, four justices
dissenting. There was no majority opinion -merely a judgment and five
separate opinions.5 Broadly stated, Justice Reed, writing for three of the
majority justices, agreed with the minority that the ordinance does regulate
freedom of speech. He regarded the regulation, however, as a necessary
and reasonable exercise of the police power based on the inherent right of a
municipality to control the use and operation of its streets. 6 The chief
flaw in the opinion, after he properly admits that the interpretation of
the effect of the statute by the highest court in New Jersey is controlling,
lies in his construing the ordinance in precisely the opposite manner.7
Justices Frankfurter and Jackson, in separate opinions, concurred in
the judgment but on somewhat different grounds. They both insisted
that mechanical sound amplification is not encompassed by freedom of
speech. A logical result of this view is that the regulation of sound itself
or of the physical sound equipment s is a simple exercise of the police
J. L. 584, 52 A.2d 806 (1947).
"'That it shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation, either as principal,
agent or employee, to play, use or operate for advertising purposes, or for any other
purpose whatsoever, on or upon the public streets, alleys or thoroughfares in the City
of Trenton, any device known as a sound truck, loud speaker or sound amplifier, or
radio or phonograph with a loud speaker or sound amplifier, or any other instrument
known as a calliope or any instrument of any kind or character which emits therefrom
loud and raucous noises and is attached to and upon any vehicle operated or standing
upon said streets or public places aforementioned." Ordinance No. 430, City of Trenton, N. J.
'It is interesting to note that the deciding vote in each instance was cast by the
Chief Justice, although on neither occasion did he personally write an opinion.
'Jamison v. Texas, 318 U. S. 413 (1943); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U. S. 569
(1941) ; City Council v. Jackson, 20 Ga. App. 710, 93 S. E. 304 (1917).
'Federal courts must accept a state court's conclusion as to the scope of the ordinance. E.g., Saia v. New York, 334 U. S. 558 (1948); Winters v. New York, 333 U. S.
507 (1948); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U. S. 569 (1941). Eleven of the twelve
justices of New Jersey's highest state court interpreted the ordinance in the Kovacs
case as prohibiting sound amplification on or upon city streets without regard to the
term "loud and raucous."
'For a discussion distinguishing these points and the dissemination of ideas, see
Note, 2 U. oF FLA. L. REv. 103, 107-108 (1949).
'135 N.
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power. Justice Frankfurter, in discussing the judicial evolution of the
phrase "preferred position of the freedoms," demonstrated the danger
of syllogistic reasoning, which results in mechanical jurisprudence rather
than in a flexible and pragmatic interpretation of the law. 9
Justice Black, dissenting, cited this ordinance as a "dangerous and
unjustifiable breach in the constitutional barriers designed to insure freedom of expression."' 1 He admitted that "the 'blare' of this new method
of carrying ideas is susceptible of abuse and may under certain circumstances constitute an intolerable nuisance," 11 but he did not define "certain circumstances."
Unquestionably, the traffic problem in business sections is more acute
from the safety standpoint than in residential districts. But it is contrary
to established principles to contend that, while a municipality may protect
its citizens on busy streets, it may not afford the same protection against
12
an invasion of the right to enjoy peace and quiet in the home.
Justice Rutledge in his dis'sent contended that this case leaves open for
future determination the question of whether a state or municipality may
prohibit all use of sound equipment in public places.' 3 Only three of
the justices in the majority considered that the ordinance was limited to
those sound trucks found to be "loud and raucous." Justice Frankfurter
supported the majority on the ground that no mechanical sound amplification is per se protected by the First Amendment, and that it is not within
the province of the judiciary to prescribe the exact formula for local regulation, but agreed with the minority that the ordinance prohibits all sound
trucks and that the words "loud and raucous"' 4 are merely descriptive.
Thus the basic problem of sound-truck regulation, namely, whether com'Kovacs v. Cooper, 69 Sup. Ct. 448, 458 (1949).
"I1d. at 461.
1
rid. at 462.

"-The thought is well discussed in the leading case of Cady v. Detroit, 289 Mich.
499, 286 N. W. 805, 810 (1939). "Ordinances having for their purpose regulated municipal development, the security of home life, the preservation of a favorable environment in which to rear children, the protection of morals and health, the safeguarding
of the economic structure upon which the public good depends, the stabilization of
the use and value of property, the attraction of a desirable citizenship and fostering its
permanency, are within the proper ambit of the police power."
"3This would include streets, alleys, parks and city picnic grounds as distinguished
from theatres, radios and indoor sound amplification.
1
'WEBsna, INTERNA rIONAL DICTIONARY (unabridged) (2d ed. 1949) defines "raucous"
as follows: hoarse, disagreeably harsh; strident; as, a raucous voice.
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plete prohibition of all sound amplifiers would be a violation of the Fiist
Amendment, is still an open question.' 5
Seven of the nine justices indicated in both the Saia and Kovacs cases1 6
that use of sound equipment is inexorably joined with the question of
freedom of speech. As a result of the Kovacs decision, Saia is now of
doubtful authority. Four of the justices specifically declared in Kovacs
that Saia was overruled, while, in addition, a fifth, Justice Frankfurter,
indicated that he still considered Saia wrongly decided, although he did
not expressly agree that it was overruled. On the other hand, three of the
majority justices in Kovacs, even though they dissented in Saia, did not
regard it as overruled. They distinguished the decisions on the ground
that the Saia ordinance vested in an administrative official the discretion
to grant or refuse licenses to use sound equipment 1 7 and accordingly constituted a "censorship of speech or religious practices before permitting
their exercise,"' 18 while the Kovacs ordinance flatly prohibited all "loud
and raucous" amplifiers on the streets.
The ordinances also differ in respect to the area they seek to regulate.
The Saia ordinance covered the city completely - streets, parks, and picnic
grounds -whereas
the Kovacs ordinance was limited specifically to the
city streets. The right to regulate the use of its streets has been recognized as conferring on a municipality authority to control activities thereon
beyond that embraced in the usual police power.' 9 Justice Reed's opinion,
"The City of Miami enacted an ordinance similar to the one contested in the
Kovacs case. Circuit Judge Miledge, in an unreported case ordering that the peti-

tioner be remanded to the custody of the Miami police, against his contention that the
ordinance forbidding all operation on the streets of vehicles with sound devices in actual
operation constituted a violation of his right of free speech, said: "... . the sound truck
is of no value to the speaker unless he obtains and holds the attention of at least some
within earshot. Reducing the risk, or rather refusing to permit an additional danger,
to those lawfully on the streets using them for their primary purpose is a proper exercise of police power. To be sure the prohibition of sound trucks on the streets is some
slight restraint on freedom of speech but no one suggests that this right is subject to
no limitations whatever. The constitution assumes an orderly society so there can be
a condition in which freedoms may be enjoyed." State ex rel. Rosenberg v. Headley,
Order No. 765-D (C. C. 11th Fla. Oct. 27, 1948).
"See note 1 supra.
"For further discussion see Note, 2 U. oi? FLA. L. Rzv. 103, 110-114 (1949).
"Kovacs v. Cooper, 69 Sup. Ct. 448, 451 (1949).

"'Pensacola v. Jones, 58 Fla. 208, 50 So. 874 (1909); House-Wives League, Inc. v.
Indianapolis, 204 Ind. 685, 185 N. E. 511 (1933); People v. Dmytro, 280 Mich. 82, 273
N. W. 400 (1937); Melconian v. Grand Rapids, 218 Mich. 397, 188 N. W. 521 (1922).
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in upholding the constitutionality of the Kovacs ordinance, placed great
emphasis on this right, thus avoiding the broader issue of impairment of
free speech presented in Saia.
The opinions in the two cases give no assurance that a majority of the
Court would be willing to reconcile them on the basis of the obvious differences in the two ordinances. The majority in Saia did not indicate that
any issue was involved other than that of freedom of speech, and the dissent in Kovacs rested on the same basis. Although three of the majority in Kovacs would not concede that any issue was necessarily involved
other than the right of a municipality to control its streets, thus implying
a distinction based on the limitation of the Kovacs ordinance to such an
area, Justices Frankfurter and Jackson went considerably further in both
cases.
CONCLUSION

Several salient and practical problems concerning the regulation and
prohibition of sound trucks and sound equipment remain undecided:
1. May there be any prohibition of other than "loud and raucous"
sound equipment on the city streets, assuming, with Justices
Black and Rutledge, that an amplifier that does not produce such
noises could be devised and would have any users?
2. Does the city have the right to bar from the streets sound itself,
as distinguished from the sound-producing equipment, so as to
allow prohibition of loud noises emitted onto the streets from
abutting property or from airplanes?
3. Is a prohibition, provided it is absolute, valid when it extends to
city property other than streets?
4. Is a prohibition, limited to streets, valid if it permits administrative discretion?
Justice Jackson stated that "Comparison of this our 1949 decision with
our 1948 decision, I think, will pretty hopelessly confuse municipal authorities as to what they may or may not do. 20o Nevertheless, two guiding factors may be utilized in drafting legislation for regulating sound
trucks:
Branahan v. Hotel Co., 39 Ohio St. 333, 334, 48 Am. Rep. 457 (1883): "The city is
clothed with power over the streets, and is charged with the duty of keeping them
open for public use and free from nuisance."
2"Kovacs v. Cooper, 69 Sup. Ct. 448, 459 (1949).
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